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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent wave of stringent drunk driving legislation, brought about by
years of intense political and media campaigning by Mothers Against Drunk
Driving and by federal monetary incentives,1 has created a climate of increased
legal intolerance toward persons charged with drunk driving offenses. 2 A social
problem with tremendous costs, drunk driving requires this strong legal
response. Drunk driving arrests number more than one million per year.3
Estimates reveal that approximately twenty percent of all American drivers
drive legally intoxicated at least once per year.4 In 1990, over 22,000 people
were killed in drunk driving accidents and another 355,000 were injured.5
* The author wishes to thank Daniel D. Connor Co., L.P.A., Amee McKim, and
Chris Reich for their comments, support, and ideas.
I "The federal government has played a significant part in promoting state adoption of
comprehensive drunk driving prevention programs incorporating administrative revocation
laws. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), under authority of the
Department of Transportation, endorses these measures by offering incentive grants to states
adopting and implementing administrative revocation legislation." Michael A. Medeiros,
Comment, Hawaii's New Administrative Driver's License Revocation Law: A Preliminary
Due Process Inquiry, 14 HAWAII L. REV. 853, 855 n.10 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 1313.5(b)
(1991)).
2 For example, the Florida State Legislature recently lowered the blood alcohol level
that constitutes an offense of drunk driving from 0.10% alcohol by weight in a person's
blood or breath to 0.08%. Additionally, the new law imposes impoundment of a convicted
drunk driver's vehicle for no less than ten days. H.B. No. 541 (codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 316.1934 (Supp. 1994)). In Kansas, the legislature lowered the illegal blood alcohol
concentration level from 0.10 to 0.08% and added a provision that for the second or
subsequent alcohol offense with an alcohol concentration of 0.15% or more, an interlock
ignition device is to be installed on the driver's motor vehicle. H. 235, 1993 Kan. Sess.
Laws 259. In contrast, the Virginia State Legislature refused to pass legislation that would
have also lowered its drunk driving blood alcohol level. Donald P. Baker & John F. Harris,
House Panel Kills Bill Targeting Drunk Drivers, WASH. PosT, Feb. 23, 1993, Final Ed., at
b08.
3 H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRrNG 23 (1992).
4 Id. at 27.
5 The Cuttng Edge Vital Statstics-Dnrnk Driving-No. 1 Killer of American Teens,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1991, Final Ed., at z05.
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Combined costs of these accidents totaled $57 billion.6
In enacting its drunk driving law, effective September 1, 1993, the Ohio
Legislature amended the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) penalty
imposed upon drivers for violations of the Implied Consent statute.7 The
amended version of ALS fails to provide the procedural protections required
for all individuals under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.8 Under the new Ohio ALS provision, when a driver is arrested
for drunk driving9 and refuses to take or fails to pass a chemical test evaluating
the amount of alcohol in his body, his driver's operating license is seized and
his driving privileges are revoked immediately. 10 The license suspension and
termination of driving privileges begin upon arrest, 11 and the driver cannot
request a hearing on the suspension until his initial appearance, which may not
occur until five days later. 12 This administrative procedure for suspending
licenses raises serious due process concerns for Ohio's drivers. Immediate
license seizure and suspension of driving privileges without some
predeprivation proceedings or protections and without a timely postsuspension
review violates a driver's due process rights by failing to provide him with the
procedures necessary to protect him from unwarranted state action and from the
erroneous deprivation of his driver's license.
The purpose of this Note is to show how Ohio's ALS law violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by evaluating the provision
under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court for
administrative license suspensions. In Part II, this Note explains the new Ohio
ALS provision, contrasting the current changes relevant to due process
questions with the previous version of the law. Part M details the treatment of
administrative license suspension procedures by the United States Supreme
Court, setting forth the standards by which to evaluate the constitutionality of
administrative license suspension laws and procedures. Next, the Note analyzes
61Id.
7 Implied consent means that all persons driving upon Ohio's roads impliedly agree to
a test that measures their alcohol consumption. OHIo Ray. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(A)
(Anderson 1993). For further explanation of implied consent, see infra notes 14-15, 26-27
and accompanying text.
8 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 A driver is considered to be driving drunk when "[he] is under the influence of
alcohol... [or] has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of
alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath; .... " OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4511.19(A) (Anderson 1993).
10 Id. § 4511.191(D)(1)(a).
11 Id.
12 Id. § 4511.191(G)(2).
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how other states have applied those standards to their ALS provisions. The
final Part analyzes Ohio's ALS provision under the Supreme Court's standards
and discusses how the law violates due process by failing such standards.
Additionally, this Part contrasts Ohio's law with other states' ALS laws, which
were analyzed in decisions by those states' supreme courts, to further illustrate
its due process deficiencies.
II. OHIO's NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION LAW
Ohio's recently adopted legislation tightens the penalties assigned for drunk
driving.13 Part of the new law is a harsher version of the administrative license
suspension penalty for violations of Ohio's Implied Consent law. 14 Implied
Consent law in Ohio serves two functions: to require drivers to submit to a
test to determine alcohol levels, the evidence of which will be used in their
criminal prosecution, and to impose civil penalties for refusing or failing the
test. 15 The purpose of the ALS penalty is to ensure a "[s]wift and [s]ure" 16
administrative response to drunk driving: one that occurs quickly and
independently of any criminal charges. 17 As a civil remedy designed to quickly
remove drunk drivers from the highways and protect the public from dangerous
driving,' 8 ALS allows the state to set a mandatory period of time that a driver
13 Sub. S.B. 62, 120th Gen. Assy., 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-188 (Baldwin) (enacted).
Nearly all substantive changes made to § 4511.191 and addressed herein were made in Sub.
S.B. 62, effective September 1, 1993. Id. at § 3, 5-219. However, the final version of
§ 4511.191 appears in Am. Sub. H.B. 152, 120th Gen. Assy., 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-
326 (Baldwin) (codified at OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Anderson 1993)). Only
minor changes, outside the scope of this Note, were made in Am. Sub. H.B. 152.
14 OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Anderson 1993), the Implied Consent statute,
includes provisions for administrative license revocation.
15 MARK P. PAWrM & JAMES M. LOOKER, Oo DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
LAW 177 (1988). The authors indicate that the civil penalty is only for refusal. However,
since publication of this summary of the law, the civil penalty for failing the blood alcohol
test has been added. See OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(F) (Anderson 1993) for failure
provision.16 Chris Booker, Ohio Cracks Down on Drunk Driving, THE INDEPENDENT
(Columbus, Ohio), Feb. 9-22, 1994, at 1, 10.
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(D)(1)(a) (Anderson 1993). The proceedings
under Ohio Revised Code § 4511.191 have been characterized by the Ohio Supreme Court
as "civil and administrative in nature... independent of any criminal proceedings...."
Hoban v. Rice, 267 N.E.2d 311,315 (Ohio 1971).
18 "We conclude that the state has a paramount interest in promoting public safety by
removing drunk drivers from the highways." Doyle v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 554
N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1990).
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is deprived of his license for failing or refusing to take a chemical test,19
without waiting for the completion of the often extensive processes afforded by
the criminal justice system to invoke any additional penalties.
The new ALS law contains two modifications that significantly alter the
procedure for invoking ALS. First, a driver loses his license immediately at the
time of refusal or failure; no temporary license is issued prior to a review of
the suspension.20 Second, the review process is altered; the time for exacting
an ALS appeal of the suspension is now within five days after arrest.21
Furthermore, the judge hearing the criminal charges against the driver22 can
continue a hearing on an ALS appeal to a later date and the judiciary has no
power to stay the execution of a suspension pending appeal or for any other
reason.23 Each change to the law makes the impact of the ALS suspension
more severe to the sanctioned driver than under the previous version of the
law.
A. Immediate Suspension and No Temporary License
A driver upon Ohio's public highways who is arrested for operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs is deemed to have
consented to taking a test to determine his blood alcohol level. 24 If a driver
refuses to take a chemical test, his driver's license is automatically suspended
for a period of one year for the first offense.25 If a driver agrees to take the
chemical test and subsequently fails it by testing over the acceptable limit of
alcohol within the body,26 his driver's license is suspended for ninety days for
19 The term "chemical test" is used here to refer to any test administered by the state
to determine the amount of alcohol in a driver's body. The various chemical tests used in
the State of Ohio measure the alcohol content in the blood, breath, or urine of an arrested
driver. See OHOREV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(A), (B) (Anderson 1993).20 See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
2 1 See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
22 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(D) (Anderson 1993) for the criminal charges
imposed for drunk driving.
23 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
24 This provision is known as Implied Consent. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(A)
(Anderson 1993).
25 Id. § 4511.191(E)(1)(a). If the driver has a record of previous refusals, the penalties
increase to a maximum suspension of five years. Id. § 4511.191(E)(1)(b)-(d). For the
purposes of this Note, penalties discussed will be those imposed for a first offense.
26 "No person shall operate any vehicle [if]... the person has a concentration of ten-
hundredths of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood.... " Id.
§ 4511.19(A)(2).
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the first offense.27
According to the prior ALS statute, if a driver refused or failed the
chemical test, his driver's license was seized, he was issued a fifteen day
temporary driving permit, and he was served a notice of suspension. 28 The
suspension was to begin on the fifteenth day after the notice of suspension was
served.29 Under the new law, however, the driver's license is seized and the
suspension takes effect immediately upon failing or refusing a chemical test.30
The arrested driver does not receive a temporary license. Driving privileges are
lost immediately and the full term of the suspension is invoked.
B. Review Process for Suspension: Time, Continuance, No-Stay
Provision
Under both the prior and existing versions of the Implied Consent law, a
driver is entitled to request a hearing of the administrative suspension in the
court where he will appear on the criminal charges imposed upon him as. a
result of his arrest.31 Under the previous version of the law, the hearing had to
be requested in writing within fifteen days of the service of the notice of
suspension upon the driver, and the hearing had to be held within thirty days of
a request made by the driver.32 "Reasonable continuance[s]" sought by the
driver requesting the hearing could be granted if requested before the date
scheduled for the hearing. 33 Requesting a hearing did not stay the running of
the suspension.3 4
Under the current law, a driver may now request an appeal on the license
27 Id. § 4511.191(F)(1). If the driver has previous convictions for driving under the
influence, the penalties increase. Id. § 4511.191(f)(2)-(4). As for refusal penalties, this
Note will refer only to suspensions imposed for first offenses.
28 Sub. S.B. 275, 119th Gen. Assy., 1992 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-827, 5-858 (Baldwin).
The previous version of § 4511.191 can be found in Sub. S.B. 275, passed by the
legislature in 1992. This version of the law was to be effective July 1, 1993. Id. at § 3, 5-
868. For purposes of comparison, Sub. S.B. 275 will be considered the previous version of
the law, as it was passed by the General Assembly and was to go into effect on July 1,
1993. The version of the law immediately preceding Sub. S.B. 275 can be found in Sub.
H.B. 837, 117th Gen. Assy., 1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-744, 5-760 (Baldwin). No
comparisons to the 1990 version of the law will be made.2 9 Sub. S.B. 275, 119th Gen Assy., 1992 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-858 (Baldwin).
30 OMORLV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(G)(1) (Anderson 1993).
31 Id. § 4511.191(H)(1).
32 Sub. S.B. 275, 119th Gen. Assy., 1992 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-827, 5-859 (Baldwin).
33 ld. By requesting a continuance, the driver waived the thirty-day time limit for his
hearing.
3 4 Id.
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suspension at his initial appearance on the criminal charges. 35 This initial
appearance must be held within five days of the arrest. 36 As with the previous
version of the law, if a driver requests an appeal at that appearance, the appeal
request or process does not stay the running of the suspension. 37 As with the
prior law, the driver may request a continuance for the hearing of the appeal
beyond the date of the initial appearance. However, the new version also
allows the Registrar38 to request a continuance. Even more notably, the new
law allows the court to continue an appeal on its own motion.39 Although a
continuance may be requested by either party and granted by the court, a
continuance, like the appeal itself, does not stay the effect of the suspension. 40
In contrast with the previous law, an express limitation on the time for the
appeal to be held is absent from the current version of the law. Thus, if either
of the parties request a continuance or the judge decides to continue the appeal
proceeding, no time frame in which the appeal must take place is mandated by
the law. Although the lack of authority of a judge to stay the ALS suspension
when a hearing is requested was mentioned in the previous version of the law,
the language of the new law makes explicit that no court has jurisdiction to stay
the operation of the suspension for any reason-at the time of the request,
pending the hearing of the appeal, or pending the outcome of the appeal
process. 41
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the changes made to the ALS
law tighten the penalties imposed upon a driver arrested for drunk driving.
These changes will no doubt increase the deterrent effect of drunk driving and
may serve to provide greater safety on Ohio's highways. 42 However, as with
35 The appeal is limited in scope to the following issues: whether the arresting officer
had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle under the
influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol content; whether the request by the officer for
the chemical test was validly executed; whether the arresting officer informed the person of
the consequences of failure or refusal of the test; or whether the person either refused the
test or the test indicated that the person had a prohibited amount of alcohol in his body.
OHIoREv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Anderson 1993).
36 Id. § 4511.191(G)(2).
37 Id. § 4511.191(H)(1).
38 The Bureau of Motor Vehicles, represented by the county or city prosecutor, is
the complaining party in an ALS appeal.
39 OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Anderson 1993).
4 Id.
41 Id.
42 "[A]dministrafive license actions frequently have been shown to be successful in
reducing drunk driving... [and in reducing] serious crashes and alcohol-related crashes.
... The theoretical explanation for this phenomenon is general deterrence due to the
increased swiftness of punishment... associated with [AIS]." Ross, supra note 3, at 65-
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any government action that requires the seizure of a personal possession (in this
case, the driver's license and the authority to operate a motor vehicle), the new
ALS law presents a potential violation of constitutional rights, and therefore it
must be scrutinized closely to determine if it comports with procedural due
process.
III. THE SUPREME CouRT's ALS STANDARD
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of administrative
license suspension, not only in the context of drunk driving offenses, but in
other contexts as well. Three cases, decided in the 1970s, provide the
foundation for an analysis of Ohio's ALS provision: Bell v. Burson,43 Dixon
v. Love,44 and Mackey v. Montrym.45 These cases illustrate the Court's
progression away from a position that emphasized protection from prehearing
deprivations of constitutionally protected interests to a position allowing
prehearing deprivations in limited circumstances. The Bell case, first of the
trilogy, represents a strict evaluation of prehearing deprivations, while Dixon
and Montrym provide a less rigorous standard of review for similar
deprivations and provide the current standard of review for ALS provisions.
A. Bell v. Burson and the "Emergency" Standard
In Bell v. Burson,46 the Court reviewed the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act, which provided that the State had to suspend the license of
an uninsured motorist involved in an accident if the motorist was unable to post
security for damages claimed by the opposing party. 47 Although the Act
provided for a presuspension administrative hearing, the hearing officer was
not permitted to accept evidence on or consider the fault of the uninsured
motorist for the accident when considering the security requirement.48
In deciding whether the hearing provided under the Georgia Act was
sufficient to comport with procedural due process, the Court considered
whether a driver has a protected interest in his license 49 and if there is such an
interest, what amount of procedural due process is required to protect that
66.
43 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
44 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
45 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
46 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
47 Id. at 535-36.48 Id. at 538.
49 Id. at 539.
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interest.50 The Court found that a driver has an important property interest in
his license, and the license shall not be taken away without the procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.51 The Court held that a
license is an entitlement and that a state's power to terminate an entitlement is
subject to constitutional restraints, whether or not the entitlement is deemed a
"right" or a "privilege." 52
Secondly, the Court adopted a "case by case" approach concerning the
amount of procedural due process required to protect such an entitlement.
Noting that a "procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may
not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case," 53 the Bell Court
held, on the facts before it, that due process was satisfied by a limited hearing
to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility of a liability judgment
against the licensee in the amount claimed by the opponent.54 The Court noted
that not all situations merit the same level of procedural protections to meet due
process minimums. However, the minimum procedures required that a
"meaningful" 55 hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case" 56 be given
before the action by the government was taken.57 Finally, the Court addressed
the issue of circumstances when a prehearing deprivation may be permissible.
Setting forth what has become known as the "emergency exception," 58 the
Court stated, "it is fundamental that except in emergency situations . . . due
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that
here involved, it must afford 'notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." 59 The
Court did not explain, however, what might constitute an "emergency."
Fuentes v. Shevin,60 decided one year following Bell, expounded upon the
emergency exception created in Bell.61 In Fuentes, debtors were deprived of
their property through a prejudgment replevin process that provided no
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 1d.
53 Id. at 540.
54 1d.
55 Id. at 542 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950)).
56 Id. at 541 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
57 Id. at 542.
58 See Margaret L. Milroy, North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers:
Minor Inconvenience or Unconstitutional Deprivation? 62 N.C. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1984).
59 Bell, 402 U.S. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
60 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
61 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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predeprivation hearing. 62 In striking down the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes that allowed for such seizure,63 the Court formulated the criteria
needed for an emergency deprivation of property without a prior hearing. 64
First, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure an important government
or public interest. 65 Second, a need for very prompt action must be present.66
Third, strict control over the use of the State's legitimate force must be
exercised-the government official initiating the procedure must do so under a
narrowly drawn statute and must determine that the seizure was necessary and
justified in that instance.67 The Court additionally noted that emergency
seizures are "truly unusual": 68
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense,
and it is often more efficient to dispense of the opportunity for such a hearing.
But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional
right.... Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or
accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular
interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken .... "Mhe
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency .... [Ihe
Due Process Clause in particular... [was] designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials .... "69
In Bell and Fuentes, the Court seemingly advocated a rigid adherence to the
protection of the individual through procedural due process, diverting from
those standards only in an emergency situation and even then applying three
narrowly-styled criteria to determine what situations constitute an emergency.
B. Dixon v. Love and the Eldridge "Balancing Test"
In 1977, the Court decided Dixon v. Love,70 a summary license suspension
6 2 407 U.S. at79.
63 Id at 96.
64Id at 91.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Ld. at 92 n.22 (citations omitted). For a more detailed analysis of the Bell/Fuentes
emergency doctrine, see Milroy, supra note 58. Milroy applies the emergency doctrine to
North Carolina's ALS provision and determines that the provision is unconstitutional. Id. at
1154-56.
70 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
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case, and applied a different standard in upholding the constitutionality of a
prehearing license suspension. In Dixon, the Illinois statute authorized that a
driver could have his license administratively suspended for repeated
convictions under Illinois' traffic laws. 71 In deciding that the appellant was not
deprived of due process by receiving a hearing only after his license was
taken,72 the Court applied a three-prong test73 taken from Mathews v.
Eldridge,74 a prior Supreme Court administrative law decision.
The issue in the Eldridge case was whether due process required that, prior
to the termination of Social Security benefits, a recipient was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.75 Holding that the "elaborate" administrative procedures 76
provided by the Social Security Administration met the requirements of
procedural due process, 77 the Court set forth three factors to consider when
determining the sufficiency of administrative procedures when there is no
presuspension evidentiary hearing: (1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the value of any additional safeguards, and (3)
the government's interest, including any additional administrative burdens that
a prehearing review would entail. 78
The Dixon Court applied the Eldridge three-prong test to an administrative
license suspension under the repeat conviction law and concluded that the
private interest of the driver in his license was outweighed by the State's
interest because the driver had the benefit of a hardship provision which would
allow him occupational driving privileges. 79 The Court stated that the driver
7 1 Id. at 107-08.
72 Id. at 115.
73 Id at 112-16.
74 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75Id. at 323.
76 Id. at 339. Before terminating" the Social Security benefits, an investigation team
reviewed the recipient's status, provided a summary of evidence to the recipient on which
the termination was based, and afforded the recipient the chance to review his medical
records, respond in writing, and submit evidence. After the team made its decision, the
determination was reviewed by a Social Security insurance examiner. If Social Security
accepted the decision, it informed the recipient that his benefits were to be terminated two
months later. Id. at 337-38. Additional post-termination review was available. If benefits
were re-established, the recipient had a right to retroactive payments. Id. at 339.
7 7 Id. at 349.
78 Id. at 334-35.
79 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977). Many states, including Ohio, allow a
driver who has lost his license under an administrative suspension to apply for occupational
driving privileges if the driver can show that his livelihood is dependent upon possession of
driving privileges. Ohio, however, has a mandatory period of absolute suspension in which
[Vol. 55:697
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also had the benefit of a fidl judicial hearing on each one of the traffic
convictions that led to the summary suspension, thus lessening the risk of
erroneous deprivation of his driver's license.80 In addition, the Court noted that
the State had an important public interest in highway safety and in the prompt
removal of dangerous drivers from the roads, thus tipping the scales in favor of
the constitutionality of the prehearing suspensions.81
Any reference to the Bell emergency doctrine is notably absent in Dixon.82
The Court quickly distinguished the Bell case based on the third prong of the
Eldridge analysis. 83 Noting that the important state interest of "safety on the
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard" was present
in Dixon but not in Bell, the Court effectively removed the Bell analysis from
application to administrative license suspension. 84 However, the Court upheld
Bell to the extent that it found that a license is an important property interest
that requires some amount of procedural due process before the license can be
taken from its owner. 85 In Dixon, the Court lessened its standard for
procedural due process for administrative license suspensions from the
emergency standard articulated in Bell and Fuentes, to the Eldridge "balancing
of interests" test, weighing competing interests to determine if any
presuspension hearing or review is required for the ALS procedures to comport
with due process.
occupational privileges are not permitted. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(1)
(Anderson 1993).80 Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113.
81 ld. at 114.
82 Concern has been raised about the Court's reluctance to apply the emergency
doctrine in this area. See Milroy, supra note 58; John P. Heisserer, Implied Consent
Statutes and the Requirements of Due Process: Are They Compatible?, 26 LoY. L. REv. 180
(1980) ("By failing to recognize adequately the emergency requirement exception in its
analysis, the [Montrym] majority may have opened a loophole through which states may
seek to circumvent procedural safeguards." Id. at 189). State supreme courts, however,
have followed the lead of the Supreme Court and applied the Eldridge balancing test to
questions about ALS compliance with procedural due process. See infra part Ifl.D. See
also, e.g., Illinois v. Schaefer, 609 N.E.2d 329 (111. 1993) (holding that failure to conduct
an ALS hearing within the statutory thirty-day period violated due process).
83 Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114.
84 Id. at 114-15. But see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for application of the Bell/Fuentes emergency doctrine to ALS
provisions).
85 Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112.
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C. Mackey v. Montrym and the Direct Application of Eldridge to ALS
Suspensions
The seminal case pertaining to ALS decided by the Supreme Court is
Mackey v. Montrym,86 decided in 1979.87 In Montrym, Massachusetts' law
requiring that a driver's license be summarily suspended for refusing a breath
test was challenged as unconstitutionally violative of due process.88 Under the
Massachusetts law, a driver's license was summarily suspended by the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles after receiving a report from the arresting officer,
countersigned by the police chief, that gave the grounds for arrest and
verification of the refusal.8 9 The Registrar would then suspend the driver's
operating license and would notify him of his right to appeal the suspension. 90
An immediate "same day" hearing was available to the driver at the moment he
relinquished his license to the Registrar.91 If the driver requested the hearing,
the Registrar would review the report of the refusal and would return the
driver's license immediately to the driver if the report did not comply with all
the requirements as set forth in Massachusetts' Implied Consent law.92 The
driver was permitted to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to
call witnesses at this review proceeding.93
In upholding the summary suspension procedure, the Court applied the
three-prong test from Eldridge.94 The Court stated that, although an
individual's interest in his driver's license is a protected one,95 the
administrative procedures available in this case were sufficient to comport with
due process.96 The Court focused on the availability of a "same day" review to
86 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
87 The Court's most recent decision on ALS is Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112
(1983). Batchelder, however, addressed the amount of detail that must be included in a
police officer's affidavit in order to comply with the Illinois ALS statute. The Court
ulimately held, under the analysis in Montrym, that the Illinois statute did not violate
procedural due process. Id. at 1119.88 Montryr, 443 U.S. at 3.
89 Id. at 4.
90 1d. at6.
9 1 1dt at7 n.5.
921d.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 10-11.
95 Id. at 10 n.7 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) and Dixon v. Love,
431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977)).
96 "We conclude, as we did in Love, that the compelling interest in highway safety
justifies the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension effective pending the outcome
of the prompt postsuspension hearing available." Id. at 19.
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the driver upon surrendering his license as sufficient to protect the driver from
erroneous deprivation and to mitigate against his interest in the continued
possession and use of his license. 97 The Court concluded that, "[the]
independent review of the report of refusal by a detached public officer should
suffice in the ordinary case to minimize the only type of error that could be
corrected by something less than an evidentiary hearing."98 The Court held
that, because of the prompt postdeprivation review (albeit actually "concurrent"
with the surrendering of the license), due process required no more than that
the "predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably
reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a
responsible government official warrants them to be." 99
The Court placed much reliance on the report of the arresting officer as an
accurate report of the facts, but noted that the "same day" hearing before the
Registrar provided an opportunity for the driver to tell "his side of the story,"
to correct clerical errors, to resolve issues of credibility, and to "seek prompt
resolution of any factual disputes he raise[d] as to the accuracy of the officer's
report" before the suspension was actually effectuated. 1°o As in Dixon, the
Court held that the State's compelling interest in highway safety justified a
prompt postsuspension hearing in lieu of a presuspension hearing.10'
D. Application of the Montrym/Eldridge Standard by Three State
Supreme Courts
Three state supreme court cases of note apply the Supreme Court standards
to ALS statutes with similar, but not identical, provisions as the new Ohio
law. 102 These cases apply the Eldridge test as expounded upon in Montrym to
conclude that the ALS provisions in Minnesota, North Carolina, and most
97 Id. at 11-17.
98 Id. at 16.
9 9 Id. at 13.
100 Id. at 15.
101 Id. at 19. In a stinging dissent, Justice Stewart argued for an application of the Bell
test to the Montrym situation. Id. at 22 (Stewart, I., dissenting). For additional law review
articles analyzing AILS provisions under the Montrym/Eldidge standards, see Heisserer,
supra note 82; Milroy, supra note 58; Stephen G. Norten, Note, The Proposed
Adniiistrafive License Suspension Procedures in Venont: How Much Process Are Drunken
Divers Due?, 11 VT. L. REv. 75 (1986).
102 For additional state supreme court cases applying the Eldridge balancing test to
various aspects of ALS, see Lavinghouse v. Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, 620 So. 2d
971 (Miss. 1993); Illinois v. Schaefer, 609 N.E.2d 329 (Il. 1993); Illinois v. Gerke, 525
N.E.2d 68 (M11. 988); Illinois v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873 (Ml. 1988); In re Fischer, 395
N.W.2d 598 (S.D. 1986); Idaho v. Ankney, 704 P.2d 333 (Idaho 1985).
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recently, Hawaii, comport with due process requirements. Although not
controlling precedent in Ohio or upon the United States Supreme Court, the
state court decisions provide additional illustrations of ALS analysis and give a
more complete framework in which to analyze Ohio's ALS law.
1. Mirnesota: Hedden v. Dirkswagger
In Hedden v. Dirkswagger,10 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court, applying the
Eldridge test, upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's ALS penalties. In this
case, the driver failed a blood alcohol test, was given a notice of revocation,
and was issued a temporary driver's permit that was valid for seven days. The
driver requested an administrative hearing and was granted one. He then
received a notice that the hearing officer had received sufficient evidence to
sustain his license revocation. 1°4
In comparing the Minnesota law to the Massachusetts law in Montrym, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the situation presented to the court was
sufficiently similar to the situation in Montrym to apply the Eldridge balancing
test. 105 First, the court concluded that the private interest of the driver in
continued possession of his license was the same in both cases.1°6 The court
stated that the availability of a temporary license immediately following arrest
plus the availability of occupational driving privileges immediately upon
request weighed heavily to mitigate against the driver's interest in the
suspended license.' 07 Additionally, the court determined that the availability of
prompt postsuspension review with a decision issued no later than fifteen days
after the request for such a review alleviated any undue burden on the
driver.10 8 As with the law in Massachusetts, the court recognized that an
immediate informal administrative review was available to the driver upon
request and the driver was entitled to representation at the hearing.' °9
In evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation, the court placed much
reliance on the officer's report as the foundation of the refusal suspension, and
it discredited any challenge to the validity of the breath test. 110 Finally, the
court held that the State had a compelling interest in protecting the highways
103 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn. 1983).
104Id. at 55.
105 Id. at 59.
1 6Id. at60.
107 Id. at 60-61.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 59. Under the Minnesota law, however, there were no provisions for
subpoenaing or cross-examining witnesses. Id. at 58.
110 Id. at 61-62.
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from drunk drivers and in deterring drunk driving by providing a strong
incentive to take the breath test and then using such tests to effectuate the
State's interest in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent
criminal proceedings. 11 The combination of procedural protections afforded to
the driver (i.e., the temporary license, occupational driving privileges, and
prompt postsuspension review), when viewed in light of the need for public
protection, was sufficient to make the ALS procedures employed constitutional.
Thus, the court found that under the Eldridge test, Minnesota ALS law
comported with due process. 112
2. North Carolina: Henry v. Edmisten
In North Carolina, a driver challenged the constitutionality of the
mandatory ten-day license suspension imposed upon him for failing a breath
test. 113 In Henry v. Edmisten,114 the ALS law included a ten-day mandatory
suspension invoked after a review by a judicial officer established probable
cause for revocation of the license. No temporary license or hardship relief in
the form of occupational driving privileges was available to the driver during
the ten-day period." 5 However, the driver could request an additional
postsuspension hearing that was required to take place within three to five
working days of the request.'16
The Henry court also applied the Eldridge test as articulated in
Montrym. 117 The court found that because of the short time of deprivation
(only ten days) and the availability of prompt postsuspension review (completed
within three to five days of the commencement of the suspension), the interest
of the driver in continued possession of his license was low, although no
hardship relief was available." 8 With regard to the second Eldridge criteria,
the court found that the danger of erroneous deprivation was lessened because
of the presuspension review by a "detached and impartial... officer" who had
to "scrutinize every condition of revocation to determine if there [was]
probable cause to believe each condition [had] been met." 119 Finally, the court
concluded that the State's interest in protecting the public was served by the
I Id. at 62-63.
112Id. at63.
113 Henry v. Edmisten, 340 S.E.2d 720, 724 (N.C. 1986).
114 Id. at 723-24.
115 Id. at 727.
116 Jd at 723-24.
117 Id. at 724-25.
11 8 Id. at 726-27.
119 Id. at 728.
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ten-day suspension. 120 The ten-day suspension was not excessive nor was it too
short; it effectively served as a "stop-gap" provision, keeping a driver charged
with drunk driving from operating a vehicle until the driver could go to trial
and possibly receive another suspension as a result of a criminal conviction. 121
3. Hawaii: Keman v. Tanaka
In 1991, Hawaii enacted its Administrative License Suspension law.122
Under the law, a driver arrested for drunk driving is given notice of the
administrative revocation and a thirty-day temporary driving permit.123 An
automatic administrative review is provided to the driver within eight days of
the revocation. 124 An administrative hearing is given, if requested, within
twenty-five days of the notice.125 If the hearing cannot be commenced or
completed before the temporary permit expires, the hearing officer may, with
good cause, extend the validity of the temporary license. 126
In Kernan v. Tanaka,127 two drivers challenged the constitutionality of
Hawaii's law. The appellants' licenses were administratively suspended under
the law, and the appellants contended that the suspension procedures were
constitutionally deficient because they failed to provide adequate due process
protections both before and after the driver's licenses were revoked. 128 The
Hawaii Supreme Court applied the MontrymlEldridge three-prong balancing
test to Hawaii's ALS law.129 The court examined the private interest of
appellants in their driver's licenses and determined that the duration of potential
wrongful deprivation, when coupled with the availability of a conditional
permit (occupational and hardship privileges) and of "timely" postdeprivation
review, was enough to uphold the statute under the first prong of the Montrym
test. 130
Under the second prong of the test, risk of erroneous deprivation, the court
12 0 Id. at 730-31.
121 Id. at 731. For a detailed analysis of North Carolina's ALS law and an argument
that the law denies drivers procedural due process under the MontymfEldridge test, see
Milroy, supra note 58.
122 Medeiro supra note 1. The author measures the new ALS provision against the
Mone-- dridge standard to determine that the law is constitutionally valid. Id. at 881-87.
123 Id. at 881.124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 881-82.
127 856 P.2d 1207, 1214 (Haw. 1993).
128 Id. at 1218.
129 Id. at 1218-19.
130 Id. at 1219-20.
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found that the availability of a temporary license immediately upon seizure of
the driver's license mitigated against the potential of erroneous deprivation. 13 1
Additionally, the availability of an administrative review, at which the arrested
driver could introduce evidence and subpoena parties, was enough to "provide
a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official
action" were as the official warranted them. 132 The court concluded that the
driver was sufficiently protected from erroneous deprivation by the
predeprivation administrative review, temporary license, and prompt
postsuspension review, to weigh in favor of the State under the second prong
of the balancing test. 133
In evaluating the third prong of the balancing test, the court concluded that
the government interest, like the interest in Montrym, was to provide public
safety. 134 The legitimate interests of the arrestees, when compared to the
State's interest in public safety, did not weigh in favor of providing additional
burdensome safeguards. 135 As such, the ALS law constitutionally promoted the
State's interest while providing sufficient due process protection to the
driver. 136 In sum, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that the number of
protections in the form of temporary licenses, administrative review, and
hardship licenses were enough to ensure that the individual received adequate
due process without a full-fledged evidentiary hearing.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OHIO LAW
An analysis of Ohio's new ALS provision under the Montym/Eldridge
tripartite test demonstrates that Ohio's law oversteps procedural due process
boundaries. Although the intention of the Ohio Legislature in enacting ALS
was to protect the public and to provide swift repercussions for drunk driving,
the ultimate result of ALS is to unconstitutionally deprive drivers of their
licenses and driving privileges without the benefit of an administrative structure
of review that the Eldridge Court contemplated in its decision' 37 and without
the protections available in the Montrym case that tipped the scales in favor of
prehearing suspensions. 138 In addition, a contrast of the Ohio ALS provision to
the ALS provisions discussed in the aforementioned North Carolina,
131 1j at 1220.
132 Id. at 1220-21.
133 ILd. at 1221.
134 Id. at 1221-22.
135 Id. at 1222.
136 Id.
137 MatheWs v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976).
138 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
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Minnesota, and Hawaii cases illustrates that Ohio's law lacks some
combination of the essential elements of hardship relief, temporary license
availability, and an informal presuspension administrative review or an
assurance of a prompt postsuspension hearing to ensure that sufficient
procedures are available to protect a driver from the wrongful deprivation of
his license.
A. The Private Interest
The first factor to be considered under an MontrymlEidridge analysis is the
private interest of a driver in possession and use of his license.1 39 Three
elements to be considered under this factor are the length of prehearing
deprivation of a license, the availability of hardship relief, and the availability
of postsuspension review. 140 The Montrym Court affirmed the Bell Court,
noting that the private interest in a driver's license is a substantial one141
because the state can never make the driver whole for the inconvenience and
economic hardship suffered when his license is erroneously taken.142 Thus, the
substantiality of the private interest must be evaluated in light of any other
protections afforded to a driver that safeguard his possession of his license
pending the outcome of an ALS hearing.
In Montryn, the driver had continued use and possession of his license
until the time he could request a hearing. 143 Hardship privileges were not
available under the Massachusetts statute. 144 The Montrym Court noted that
hardship privileges were not a "controlling" factor in determining the weight of
the private interest in a license; however, the Court noted that the hardship
privileges that were available in the Dixon case played a more important role
because of the "delay [the Illinois courts had] in providing a postsuspension
hearing." 145
In Ohio, the length of suspension-ninety days for failure of a chemical
test, one year for refusal146-is no greater than the length of suspension that
was imposed upon the driver in Montrym. However, the Ohio law substantially
deviates from that found in Montrym. First, Ohio does not provide a "same
day" administrative review hearing at the time a driver surrenders his license.
139 Id. at 11.
140 Id. at 11-12.
141 Id. at 10-11.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 15.
144 Id. at 12.
145 Id.
146 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(E), (F) (Anderson 1993).
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Second, in Ohio, a license is seized at the time of the arrest-a driver does not
have the benefit of continued use and possession of his license until his
suspension can be reviewed. 147 Third, although a driver may request an appeal
at his five-day hearing, and may actually have the hearing at that time, the law
does not mandate that the hearing take place at that time or within any time
limitation.148 Thus, a cdiver is not assured of the "prompt postdeprivation
review" given in Montrym. Contributing to this indefiniteness in the time for a
hearing, judges at the initial appearance may not be prepared to hear a
requested appeal on an ALS suspension and can continue it at their own
discretion.149 Thus, it is not unlikely that an appeal hearing will be continued
until a later date. Additionally, the judge has no power to stay the driver's
suspension pending the hearing.150 Without this authority, if the appeal is
continued to a time beyond the initial appearance, the driver is forced to be
without his license up until the time he can request occupational driving
privileges.' 51
Although Montrym did not find the availability of hardship relief
controlling, Ohio's hardship relief is noticeably unavailable to drivers for a
substantial time period following an administrative suspension. Ohio ALS
provides for a mandatory period of "absolute suspension," meaning that
hardship or occupational driving privileges are not available for fifteen days for
failure and one month for refusal.152 Therefore, unlike the drivers in Montrym
or Dixon, a driver has his license seized upon arrest and loses associated
driving privileges for a minimum of fifteen days even if an appeal is pending.
Because of the lack of hardship relief, the unavailability of a temporary license,
and the uncertainty that an ALS appeal will be commenced and completed in a
"prompt" fashion, a driver's interest in his license weighs more heavily in
favor of additional administrative procedures to protect his property interest
than did the driver's interest in the Montrym case.
A comparison to the state supreme court decisic ns highlighted above
illustrates the Ohio ALS deficiencies in protecting the driver's private interest
in his license. In applying the first prong of the MontrymlEldridge test, the
14 7 Concededly, occupational driving privileges are available after a mandatory 15 day
absolute suspension for failure of a chemical test for the first offense, and one month after
refusal of a chemical test for a first refusal. Id. §§ 4507.16(E)(1), 4511.191(1)(2)(b)Ci).
However, it is the period of time that elapses before the availability of such relief that is the
concern of this Note.
148 Id. § 4511.191(H).
149 Id.
150 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 147.
152 See supra note 147.
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state courts concentrated on the availability of a temporary license, the deadline
for hearing, and the availability of hardship relief. In Henry v. Ednisten,153 the
North Carolina Supreme Court noted that the ALS suspension imposed on the
driver was for a maximum of ten days and that a postsuspension hearing must
be completed within three to five days of the driver's request for a hearing.
This request could be effectuated immediately after revocation by walking into
a Registrar's office and requesting a hearing. 154 As a result, these provisions
provided additional protections to the driver sufficient to reduce "the actual
weight of the private interest in continuous use and possession of one's driver's
license pending the outcome of the hearing." 155
Likewise, in the Minnesota case of Hedden v. Dirkwagger,156 the court
focused on the availability of a seven-day temporary license, a "limited
license," 157 and an immediate informal review procedure as forms of relief
mitigating the effects of a prehearing ALS suspension.1 58 In the Hawaii case of
Kernan v. Tanaka,159 the court cited the availability of a full hearing before the
expiration of a temporary license as a complete protective mechanism against
lack of due process for the driver. In contrast, Ohio offers none of these
procedures to protect the driver's interest. A temporary license is not available
at any time; occupational privileges are available only after, at minimu,
fifteen days. The time for a hearing and decision on the driver's ALS appeal is
not limited by time constraints; a driver cannot count on a hearing or a decision
in any set length of time. Additionally, an informal presuspension review of
AL is not available.160 Thus, Ohio's law falls short of adequately protecting a
153 340 S.E.2d 720, 727 (N.C. 1986).
154 Id.
155 Ud
156 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983).
157 "Limited license" means occupational or hardship driving privileges are permitted.
Id. at 55.
15 8 Id. at 61.
159 856 P.2d 1207, 1207 (Haw. 1993).
16 0 It may be argued that when the Registrar receives the Officer's report, a "review"
is conducted at that time. The Registrar, before invoking the suspension, must be sure that
the report, on its face, contains each element mandated by Ohio Revised Code § 4511.191.
However, the driver has no right to be present with counsel at that review, to challenge any
of the elements, to "tell his side of the story," or to ensure that the revocation of his license
suspension is procedurally correct. The language of the statute expressly states that, "[u]pon
receipt of the sworn report of an arresting officer.., the registrar shall enter into his
records the fact that the person's... license... was suspended by the arresting officer."
OfI-OREV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(F) (Anderson 1993) (emphasis added). This Note asserts
that the Ohio law is written in such a way that the Registrar serves more of a "recording"
function-to record the already existing fact of suspension-rather than a "review"
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driver's property interest in his license. To meet the Montrym standard, Ohio
must at least provide some form of guaranteed prompt postsuspension review
with a prompt resolution, must confer authority to a judge to stay the
suspension at his discretion in lieu of a prompt proceeding, or must provide
temporary or limited occupational driving privileges to the driver in the
interim. Ohio law provides for none of these procedural protections.
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Montrym requires that when "prompt postsuspension review is available
for correction of administrative error,... the predeprivation procedures used
[must] be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the
facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official
warrants them to be." 161 Because the driver had a "same day" hearing
available to'challenge the arresting officer's report, the Court noted that relying
on the report to effectuate the suspension was justified. 162 Additionally, the
Court noted that the refusal of a driver had to be signed by two officers at the
time of refusal, thus increasing the reliability of the officer's report. 163 The
Court noted that, because of the procedures in place to evaluate the reliability
of the ALS suspension, the "reliability [of the grounds for the suspension
would not] be materially enhanced by mandating the presuspension
'hearing.'"164
Ohio fails to measure up to the minimums set forth by Montrym in this
area. Without a presuspension or concurrent "same day" review by the
Registrar at which the driver can challenge the accuracy and veracity of the
facts in the officer's report, the risk of erroneous deprivation during the time
between the revocation begins and the resolution of his appeal is significantly
higher than in Montrym. The process of review found in the Montrym case
relates more closely to the "elaborate" and "carefully structured"
administrative procedures the Eldridge Court cited in developing the balancing
test.165 At the very least, in Montrym, a hearing available immediately upon the
driver's license suspension was enough to satisfy the Eldridge directive of
requiring "something less than an evidentiary hearing... prior to adverse
administrative action" be provided to an individual. 166
function-to analyze the officer's report and then invoke the suspension.
161 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
162 Id. at 13-16.
163 Id. at 14.
164 Id. at 17.
165 See supra notes 76-77.
166 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
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Ohio does not have an informal review process in place at which the driver
can challenge the accuracy of the report used to invoke his suspension. The
lack of this presuspension process, when coupled with the unpredictability in
the timeliness of postsuspension appeal, balances in favor of requiring some
presuspension review procedures or, at the very least, a closely regulated
postsuspension procedure to protect a driver from the irreparable injury of the
erroneous loss of his license.
In Edmisten, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on its review
procedure to meet the requirements of the second factor. 167 The court noted
that "[b]efore revocation can take place in North Carolina, a detached and
impartial judicial officer must scrutinize every condition of revocation to
determine if there is probable cause to believe each condition has been met." 168
In Hawaii, the court indicated that no erroneous prehearing suspension was
possible because the ALS suspension required an administrative hearing before
the suspension commenced. 169 Ohio has neither of these provisions. For Ohio's
law to comport with due process in the absence of a prompt and clearly
delineated procedure for postsuspension review, some review of the suspension
elements would need to be present before an ALS suspension begins. Placing
reliance on an officer's report to effectuate the suspension without any review
or "same day" postsuspension hearing presents a risk of erroneous deprivation
that is more significant than in the procedural context of the Montrym case.
C. The State's Interest
The "unquestionable gravity" 170 of the state's interest in protecting the
public from drunken drivers and deterring drunk driving has tipped the scales
in favor of prehearing license deprivations in Montrym'7' and Dixon172 as well
as in the state supreme court cases mentioned here. 173 The Montrym Court
16 7 Henry v. Edmisten, 340 S.E.2d 720, 727-29 (N.C. 1986).
16 8 Id. at 728. _
16 9 Kernan v. Tanaka, 856 P.2d 1207, 1220-21 (Haw. 1993).
170 See Norten, supra note 101, at 99.
171 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
17 2 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977).
173 Kernan, 856 P.2d at 1222 ("We conclude that the additional safeguard of
presuspension judicial intervention is... [not] required... when weighed against the
strong public policy of removing drunken drivers from our highways."); Henry v.
Edmisten, 340 S.E.2d 720, 731 (N.C. 1986) ("[W]e conclude the state's compelling interest
in highway safety outweighs the private interests involved and any risk of erroneously
depriving those interests."); Hedden v. Dirkswagger, 336 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Minn. 1983)
("The compelling interest in highway safety justifies the State of Minnesota in making a
revocation effective pending the outcome of the prompt post-suspension hearing.").
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concluded that "the compelling interest in highway safety justifies... making
a summary suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt
postsuspension hearing available." 174 In Dixon, the Court noted that the
automatic delay afforded by a presuspension hearing would encourage drivers
to routinely request such hearings and thus frustrate the state's interest.175 All
three state court cases above cite Monnym in referring to the importance of the
state's interest and indicate that, when in balance with the other factors, the
state's interest is enough to allow a prehearing administrative license
suspension. 176
In Ohio, the state's interest in protecting the public and in deterring drunk
driving that is effectuated through ALS has also been determined to be
compelling.1 77 The compelling nature of these interests is undeniable when
reviewing the frightening statistics associated with drunk driving. 178 Although
these interests are vitally important, they are not sufficient to merit ALS
procedures that violate due process. First, the state's interest in protecting the
public from drunk drivers is not served by an immediate effectuation of a
license suspension that stays in effect ninety days to one year. An arrest itself
serves to remove from the highways a driver who has tested over the legal limit
for blood alcohol content and who is a danger to the public at the time of
testing. Thus, a license suspension invoked for a twenty-four hour period after
the driver's arrest with a temporary license issued afterward 179 would be
effective to protect the public from the immediate danger and yet be
procedurally sound by preserving the driver's interest in his license pending the
outcome of an requested ALS appeal.
Second, Ohio provides no significant mitigating provisions to allow driving
privileges pending the outcome of a hearing. The effectiveness of ALS as a
deterrent does not depend on the immediacy of the suspension, but on the
automatic nature of it. 180 To provide a driver temporary or limited privileges
174 Montrym, 443 U.S. at 19.
175 Din, 431 U.S. at 114.
176 See supra notes 111-112, 120-121, 134-135 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. Additionally, in Ohio in 1993, 400
people were killed in alcohol related accidents. Booker, supra note 16, at 10.
179 Connecticut, for example, has a 24 hour suspension period with a subsequently
issued temporary license. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227b(c) (1992).
180 Ross, supra note 3. Ross notes that all states with ALS have some period of
continued driving privileges for a driver following seizure of his license by the state when
arrested for drunk driving, during which time an administrative hearing can be requested.
Id. at 65. Additionally, Ross notes that evaluations of these ALS laws report reductions in
alcohol related and nighttime fatal crashes in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and West Virginia after the
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while a hearing is pending does not alter the effectiveness of the suspension; so
long as the arresting officer has met the requirements to impose a suspension, a
suspension will result. Ohio's interest in ALS as a deterrent for drunk driving
is well-served by an ALS procedure that does not result in the suspension of a
license before the opportunity for some form of administrative or judicial
review.
V. CONCLUSION
The body of law generated by the Supreme Court and its progeny applying
to Administrative License Suspension has weighed in favor of the interests of
the state over the interests of the individual. This result certainly has
legitimacy. The importance of an effective ALS provision is not to be
disregarded. ALS suspensions have become a critical part of crucial legislation
designed to deter drunk driving'81 and to protect our nation's highways from
unnecessary dangers and have proved to be an effective method of meeting
state interests in this area. In Ohio, however, the enthusiasm of the legislature
for imposing swift and certain repercussions upon drivers charged with drunk
driving offenses has resulted in an ALS provision that oversteps the
constitutional bounds set by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Ohio
has committed the greatest offense to procedural due process by failing to
provide some combination of procedural protections to insulate an individual,
however blameworthy, from the deprivation of his license without
constitutionally essential proceedings. By denying a driver any predeprivation
review of the arresting officer's allegations, by providing no temporary license
to the driver while he is awaiting review or by failing to ensure prompt
availability of limited driving privileges in place of a temporary license, and by
failing to ensure that a postsuspension appeal is completed in a timely fashion,
Ohio's law falls short of being constitutional. Ohio's law fails the Montrym due
process standard because the law does not provide the minimal presuspension
administrative procedures that would make a postsuspension hearing
constitutional.
If the Ohio Supreme Court has an opportunity to review the new ALS
implementation of these laws. Id. at 66 (citing 1. Nicols and H.L. Ross, The effectiveness of
legal sanctions in dealing with drinking drivers, 6 ALCOHOL, DRUGS, & DRIVING 51
(1990)).
181 A recent study by the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety found that ALS is the
single most effective deterrent for drunk driving. Eric Pianin, Bill Urges Suspendi'ng of
Drunk Drivers' Licenses; Federal Highway Trust Funds Would Be Offered as Incentive,
WASH. POST, May 12, 1988, at b04.
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provision,182 it is likely the court will find that the law passes its due process
scrutiny. 183 However, although the law is essential to protect Ohio drivers
from highway danger and to deter drunk driving, these needs are not
sufficiently essential to eliminate procedural due process protections and to
expose all citizens to the loss of a liberty that has been historically guaranteed
no matter how horrible the crime. The Ohio Supreme Court should strike down
this version of Ohio's ALS law as unconstitutional and force the legislature to
develop an otherwise effective ALS provision that is equally effective in
protecting the essential procedural due process rights of Ohio's drivers.
182 The question of the constitutionality of the Ohio ALS provision may soon
reach the Ohio Supreme Court. A Miami County Municipal Court Judge recently
ruled that "[tio deny a person the right to operate a motor vehicle without any hearing
is a violation of due process and as such is unconstitutional." State v. Sanders, No. 94-
TR-3104 (Miami County, Ohio Mun. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994); see also James Hannah,
ACLU, Lawyers Praise Ruling on Tough Drunken Driving Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Sept. 9, 1994, at 6C.
183 See Doyle v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 554 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1990) (holding
that in Ohio, a license to drive is a privilege, not a right, and applying Eldridge factors to
determine that the summary suspension of a driver's license of an "alcoholic" does not
violate due process); Maumee v. Gabriel, 518 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio 1988) (holding that
summary suspension of a driver's license under the Nonresident Violator Compact when
analyzed under the Eldridge balancing test is constitutional).
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